Cybersecurity/Goverment/TLS and cyphers: Difference between revisions
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TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the direct replacement for SSL: | TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the direct replacement for SSL: | ||
[Netscape] | [Netscape] [IETF Standard] | ||
SSL 1.0 ──> SSL 2.0 ──> SSL 3.0 ──> TLS 1.0 ──> TLS 1.1 ──> TLS 1.2 ──> TLS 1.3 | SSL 1.0 ──> SSL 2.0 ──> SSL 3.0 ──> TLS 1.0 ──> TLS 1.1 ──> TLS 1.2 ──> TLS 1.3 | ||
(1994) (1995) (1996) (1999) (2006) (2008) (2018) | (1994) (1995) (1996) (1999) (2006) (2008) (2018) | ||
─────── PROHIBITED ─────────── ──── DEPRECATED ──── ─── VALID/APPROVED ─── | ─────── PROHIBITED ─────────── ──── DEPRECATED ──── ─── VALID/APPROVED ─── | ||
🤬 Many people even developers talk about SSL - SSL is a fossil 🦖- They are realy talking about TLS but SSL is burned into the cluture very deep - for example "SSL Certificates" that are really "x.509 Cetfificates" | |||
Latest revision as of 16:27, 22 October 2026
TLS Versions
- TLS <1.2 - Should never be used
- TLS 1.2 - Used under some circumstances
- TLS 1.3 - Preferred
Valid Cypher Suites
The TLS version alone is not enough, the underlying hardware, software and cypher suites must be considered.
| Protocol Version | NIST Priority | Standard RFC Cipher Name | Key Exchange / Encryption Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| TLS 1.3 | 🌟 Preferred | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | AEAD / 128-bit AES-GCM (Mandatory baseline) |
| TLS 1.3 | 🌟 Preferred | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | AEAD / 256-bit AES-GCM (Mandatory baseline) |
| TLS 1.3 | ✅ Acceptable | TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | AEAD / 128-bit AES-CCM |
| TLS 1.2 | 🌟 Preferred | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ECDH Exchange + ECDSA Auth + 128-bit AES-GCM |
| TLS 1.2 | 🌟 Preferred | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ECDH Exchange + ECDSA Auth + 256-bit AES-GCM |
| TLS 1.2 | 🌟 Preferred | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ECDH Exchange + RSA Auth + 128-bit AES-GCM |
| TLS 1.2 | 🌟 Preferred | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ECDH Exchange + RSA Auth + 256-bit AES-GCM |
| TLS 1.2 | ⚠️ Legacy Fallback | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | ECDH Exchange + ECDSA Auth + 128-bit AES-CBC |
| TLS 1.2 | ⚠️ Legacy Fallback | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | ECDH Exchange + ECDSA Auth + 256-bit AES-CBC |
| TLS 1.2 | ⚠️ Legacy Fallback | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | ECDH Exchange + RSA Auth + 128-bit AES-CBC |
| TLS 1.2 | ⚠️ Legacy Fallback | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | ECDH Exchange + RSA Auth + 256-bit AES-CBC |
| TLS 1.2 | ⚠️ Legacy Fallback | TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | Finite Field DH + RSA Auth + 128-bit AES-GCM |
| TLS 1.2 | ⚠️ Legacy Fallback | TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | Finite Field DH + RSA Auth + 256-bit AES-GCM |
Why not TLS 1.1
The core problem with TLS 1.1 even with a valid cypher suite is man-in-the-middle attacks.
The cypher suite only protects data after a secure connection is established. The key problem been how TLS 1.1 manages the connection.
- An attacker could modifiy the handshake and downgrade the connection.
- Injection of data into the TLS session.
What about SSL?
TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the direct replacement for SSL:
[Netscape] [IETF Standard] SSL 1.0 ──> SSL 2.0 ──> SSL 3.0 ──> TLS 1.0 ──> TLS 1.1 ──> TLS 1.2 ──> TLS 1.3 (1994) (1995) (1996) (1999) (2006) (2008) (2018) ─────── PROHIBITED ─────────── ──── DEPRECATED ──── ─── VALID/APPROVED ───
🤬 Many people even developers talk about SSL - SSL is a fossil 🦖- They are realy talking about TLS but SSL is burned into the cluture very deep - for example "SSL Certificates" that are really "x.509 Cetfificates"
